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Abstract
Background: New vector control tools are needed to combat insecticide resistance and reduce mal-
aria transmission. The World Health Organization (WHO) endorses larviciding as a supplementary
vector control intervention using larvicides recommended by the WHO Pesticides Evaluation
Scheme (WHOPES). The decision to scale-up larviciding in Nigeria provided an opportunity to in-
vestigate the factors influencing policy adoption and assess the role that actors and evidence play
in the policymaking process, in order to draw lessons that help accelerate the uptake of new meth-
ods for vector control.
Methods: A retrospective policy analysis was carried out using in-depth interviews with national
level policy stakeholders to establish normative national vector control policy or strategy decision-
making processes and compare these with the process that led to the decision to scale-up larvicid-
ing. The interviews were transcribed, then coded and analyzed using NVivo10. Data were coded
according to pre-defined themes from an analytical policy framework developed a priori.
Results: Stakeholders reported that the larviciding decision-making process deviated from the
normative vector control decision-making process. National malaria policy is normally strongly
influenced by WHO recommendations, but the potential of larviciding to contribute to national eco-
nomic development objectives through larvicide production in Nigeria was cited as a key factor
shaping the decision. The larviciding decision involved a restricted range of policy actors, and
notably excluded actors that usually play advisory, consultative and evidence generation roles.
Powerful actors limited the access of some actors to the policy processes and content. This may
have limited the influence of scientific evidence in this policy decision.
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that national vector control policy change can be facilitated
by linking malaria control objectives to wider socioeconomic considerations and through engaging
powerful policy champions to drive policy change and thereby accelerate access to new vector
control tools.
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Background
The scale-up of vector control has been critical to the reduction in
malaria transmission seen over the past decade (World Health
Organization 2012b). Key tools for vector control include long last-
ing insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) and indoor residual spraying
(IRS) (World Health Organization 2013d). In sub-Saharan Africa,
the percentage of households owning at least one insecticide-treated
net increased from 3 to 54% between 2000 and 2013 (World
Health Organization 2013d) with the number of nets delivered to
malaria endemic countries by manufactures increasing from 6 to
136 million between 2004 and 2013 (World Health Organization
2013d). However, new vector control tools are urgently needed, to
combat the increasing resistance that is threatening the effectiveness
of existing insecticide-based interventions (Ranson et al. 2011;
World Health Organization 2012b) and to control malaria vectors
not targeted by current interventions (e.g. those that bite outdoors).
Larval source management (LSM) is the management of water
bodies that are potential breeding sites for malaria vectors. It includes
habitat modification or the addition of chemicals to water bodies to pre-
vent the development of adult mosquitoes (larviciding). Larviciding has
been recognized as a valuable addition to malaria vector control in spe-
cific settings. WHO recommends that in sub-Saharan Africa, LSM
should only be implemented as a supplement to LLINs and IRS in
clearly defined habitats, particularly in urban areas where malaria vec-
tor breeding sites are few, fixed and findable (World Health
Organization 2012a; World Health Organization 2013c). In 2012, na-
tional malaria control programmes in six African countries reported
using larviciding (World Health Organization 2013c).
In recent years, the Economic Union of West African States
(ECOWAS) has generated a renewed interest in scaling-up larviciding
in West Africa. A tripartite agreement, between ECOWAS, Venezuela
and Cuba was signed in 2009 to provide financial and technical sup-
port to scale-up larviciding in the region with a view to eliminating
malaria. Technology transfer for the establishment of microbial larvi-
cide factories in Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire forms part of the
agreement, in a bid to create jobs and make larvicides readily available
in the region (ECOWAS, 2013). Microbial larvicides have been shown
to be protective against malaria (Fillinger and Lindsay 2006;
Geissbuhler et al. 2009), but only one strain (Bacillus thuringiensis
subsp. israelensis, strain AM65-52, WG) has been approved for
larviciding by the WHO’s Pesticide Evaluation Scheme (WHOPES)
(World Health Organization 2013b). The ECOWAS larviciding plans
involve the use of two larvicides produced by the Cuban company,
Labiofam. These larvicides, BACTIVEC (Bacillus thuringiensis SH-
14) and GRISELESF (Bacillus sphaericus stump 2362), do not cur-
rently have WHOPES approval.
Malaria is endemic in Nigeria and remains a serious public
health problem with 97% of the total population at risk of infection
(National Population Commission and National Malaria Control
Programme 2010). LLINs are the main prevention strategy in the
country with the current National Malaria Strategic Plan (NMSP)
aiming for 80% LLIN ownership and use by 2013 (National
Malaria Control Programme 2009b). However, only 41% of house-
holds have at least one LLIN (National Population Commission and
National Malaria Control Programme 2010). IRS is considered a
complementary strategy to LLINs in Nigeria and has been piloted in
some states (coverage 1% within the targeted states), with the ob-
jective of being scaled-up to cover 20% of the targeted states’ popu-
lation, primarily in urban areas by 2013 (National Population
Commission and National Malaria Control Programme 2010). LSM
(including larviciding) is included in the current NMSP (National
Malaria Control Programme 2009b; World Health Organization
2013a), but its use to date has been extremely limited. Thus, plans
to scale-up larviciding nationwide, using non-WHOPES approved
products, represents a deviation from the current malaria control
strategy in Nigeria.
Given the alarming rise in insecticide resistance in Africa, it is
likely that many countries are going to have to consider changing
their vector control policy and deploying additional vector control
interventions. The decision to scale-up larviciding in Nigeria pro-
vided an opportunity to investigate the factors influencing policy
adoption and assess the role that actors and evidence play in the pol-
icymaking process in order to draw lessons that help accelerate the
uptake of new methods for vector control.
Methods
Analytical framework
A review of the literature on policy analysis was carried out to iden-
tify suitable analytical frameworks for policy analysis. An analytical
Key Messages
• Policy analysis can be used to aid our understanding of how to accelerate policy change. In the field of malaria vector
control, policy analysis has so far revealed concerns about donor pressure and lack of engagement of national level pol-
iticians. It has highlighted the potential for policy champions, international networks and involvement of researchers in
policy development to aid translation of research into policy.
• Additional vector control tools are needed to combat insecticide resistance and reduce malaria transmission. Larviciding
is endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a supplementary vector control intervention that has been
adopted by relatively few African endemic countries. The uptake of larviciding by policymakers in West Africa presents
an opportunity to better understand policymaking processes for vector control interventions and accelerate access to
new vector control tools.
• The larviciding policy process in Nigeria deviated from the normative vector control process. It was initiated at the high-
est political levels involving a restricted range of actors, notably excluding those that usually play advisory, consultative
and evidence generation roles. This may have limited the influence of scientific evidence. The potential of larviciding to
contribute to national economic development objectives was cited as a key factor influencing support for this policy.
• Uptake or scale up of malaria control can be facilitated by linking malaria control objectives to wider economic consider-
ations and through engaging powerful policy champions to drive policy change. However, care needs to be taken to en-
sure that evidence of effectiveness is also central to the policy process.
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framework which combines the policymaking context, actors, pro-
cess, content, power (Walt 1994) and the role of evidence in policy-
making (Court and Young 2006) was developed (Figure 1; Table 1).
The framework was used to guide all aspects of the study from the
identification of documents for the desk review; identification of key
informants (KI), development of study instruments and data ana-
lysis. The concept of power, which can be expressed in various
ways, is a crucial element of the Walt and Gilson framework (Walt
1994). In this article, we investigate a number of dimensions of
power expressed in the policy process including ‘decision-making’
(Dahl, 1961), ‘agenda setting’, (Bachrach and Baratz 1962),
‘thought control’ (Lukes 1974) and the ability to undermine influ-
ence (Radcliffe 2000). Recognizing that power is methodologically
difficult and sensitive to investigate (Erasmus and Gilson 2008;
Lehmann and Gilson 2013) we sought to gather information by ask-
ing questions on ‘which actors carried the most influence in the pol-
icy process and why’.
Document review
A review of published and unpublished national documents was
undertaken to: understand the national vector control policy con-
text; identify the content of the national vector control policies;
identify the key actors involved in national vector control and in-
form the development of the semi-structured interview guide.
Documents reviewed included: national malaria policies, strategies
and guidelines; national malaria vector control policies, strategies
and guidelines; organograms and structures of Federal Ministry of
Health (FMOH); terms of reference and minutes of meetings of na-
tional policymaking bodies; policies, strategies, action plans, press
releases and web pages of policymaking bodies, as well as research,
implementing and financing institutions involved in malaria vector
control in Nigeria.
Documents were sourced through on-line searches (Google
Scholar and PubMed) and requests to relevant individuals and or-
ganizations. The review was supplemented with documents identi-
fied by stakeholders during interviews.
To guide the document review, different categories of policy
(health, meso and macro) and strategy, as used by Mays (Mays
2011) and Buse (2012) were defined (Table 2).
Identification of key informants
The document review identified a broad range of stakeholders
involved in the vector control policymaking process in Nigeria.
These were categorized as: policymakers, researchers, private sector
Context
ssecorPtnetnoC
Source: Adapted from Walt G, 1994
Actors
Figure 1. Analytical framework
Table 1. Definitions of terms used in Analytical Framework (Adapted fromWalt 1994)
Framework
category
Definition
Context Systemic factors, including political, economic and social, at national and international levels, that influence vector control
policy
Actors Stakeholders (individuals or organizations) that make/influence vector control policy
Process The way polices are developed
Content The technical content of the specific policy under analysis
Evidence in
Policy Making
‘Any form of knowledge, including, but not confined to research, of sufficient quality to be used to inform decisions’ (Buse
et al. 2012)
Power The ability to influence, and in particular, the ability to control resources. Power is characterized by authority, finances and
access to knowledge
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representatives, multilateral agency representatives and nongovern-
ment organization (NGO) representatives. For the purposes of this
study, policymakers include staff of the FMOH working in the
National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP); NGOs include re-
spondents from national NGOs implementing malaria control pro-
jects; multilaterals include United Nations technical agencies as well
as multilateral funding institutions supporting malaria control; re-
searchers, include those working in academia as well as those in na-
tional institutes of research; private sector refers to those in the
commercial for-profit sector involved in the sale of vector control
tools and insecticides. KIs were purposefully sampled to cover a
comprehensive subset of the national stakeholders and represent
each stakeholder category.
A list of KIs was drawn up and contacted to request interviews.
A greater number of participants were interviewed from the NGO
category as they made up the largest number and diversity of organi-
zations and individuals contributing to the policymaking process.
The initial list of KIs was expanded to include additional KIs identi-
fied during interviews.
All KIs were anonymized by assigning interviewee numbers so
that their names and affiliations/institutions were not identifiable.
However, quotes are assigned to their stakeholder category e.g. pol-
icymaker or NGO, in order to highlight their perspective.
Data collection
The interviews followed a semistructured, open-ended format and
was structured to explore the context, actors, process, content,
power and the use of evidence in both (a) national vector control
policy decisions and (b) in the planned scale-up of larviciding. See
Supplementary File S1 for the interview guide. In March 2013, KT
conducted the interviews in English in Abuja, Nigeria. The inter-
views were transcribed by a transcription service and KT checked all
for accuracy.
Data analysis
KT entered interviews into NVivo10 for data management and ana-
lysis. KT coded data according to the pre-defined themes in the pol-
icy framework using content analysis. Key themes were then
summarized into areas of consensus and divergent views across
stakeholder perspectives, and quotes used to illustrate key themes.
All authors were involved in the analysis and interpretation of data.
Results
A total of 14 national level stakeholders were interviewed: 3 policy-
makers, 1 researcher, 1 private sector representative, 4 multilateral
agencies and 5 NGOs. The interviewees were a comprehensive
subset of the potential respondents. All key in-country Roll Back
Malaria Partners (RBM) and 14 of the 20 members of the Integrated
Vector Management Subcommittee (IVM-SC) (the main technical
body coordinating government and stakeholder input into vector
control policy) were interviewed encompassing all identified stake-
holder categories. The narrative for the results is based on the docu-
ment review and KI perceptions. The normative process is as
described by the Framework for the coordination of malaria control
programme in Nigeria (National Malaria Control Programme
2009a) and the WHO Malaria Programme Review 2013 (WHO and
Nigeria National Malaria Control Programme 2013) supplemented
by the respondents’ perceptions of the ‘normal’policy process. The
larviciding decision-making process is then compared and con-
trasted with this ‘norm’.
Normative vector control policy analysis
Context
Nigeria is a Federation of 36 states, with three tiers of government
(federal, state and local), each of which have a constitutional man-
date to formulate and implement health policies and programmes
(WHO and Nigeria National Malaria Control Programme 2013).
The primary effect of the federal nature on the vector control policy-
making context was the recognition by all respondents that, while
the federal government has oversight of health policy, states can
choose which vector control strategies to resource and implement
based on their local context.
You see the nature of Nigeria is such that even when policies are
made in the national level it is now left to the State to adopt it
(Researcher)
Vector control policymaking is heavily influenced by WHO policies
and recommendations of universal coverage of LLINs and the scale-
up of IRS.
. . . We align A LOT with the Global Malaria Programme, WHO
(Policymaker)
The health policy context is also influenced by the NMCP’s role in
contributing to the wider national health, social and economic de-
velopment objectives as articulated in the 2010 Nigerian National
Strategic Health Development Plan (Federal Ministry of Health
(Nigeria) 2010) and the Nigerian Vision 2020 strategy (Federal
Government of Nigeria 2009). National policy documents revealed
that national malaria vector control policymaking largely involves
mesolevel policies and decisions around appropriate vector control
strategies, i.e. the working structure of implementation. Thus, when
KIs were asked about policymaking, they invariably spoke about
strategy decision-making.
Table 2. Definitions of levels of policies
Term Definition
Health Policy Decisions, plans and actions that are undertaken to achieve specific health care goals within a society. It defines a vision for
the future which in turn helps to establish targets and points of reference for the short and medium term. Courses of ac-
tion (and inaction) that affect the set of institutions, organizations, services and funding of the health system
Macrolevel
policies
National high level policies that are generally broad in nature and require several inputs to achieve their aspiration. E.g.
Reduce child mortality.
Mesolevel policies National Programme level translation of a Macro policy into a working structure for an implementable programme. E.g.
universal coverage of LLINs, targeted use of IRS
Strategy Strategy is the direction in which the human and physical resources will be deployed and applied to achieve the objectives
of the policies. E.g. Universal coverage of LLIN (the policy) through the free mass distribution to households (the
strategy)
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Actors
Actors involved in vector control strategy decision-making generally
participated in one or more of four main capacities: (a) policy/strat-
egy decision-making; (b) advisory/technical; (c) consultative and (d)
evidence generation. Figure 2 presents a synthesis of respondents’
views on the actors and their roles in the strategy decision-making
process
Policy/strategy decision-making
All KI’s recognized that the FMOH has ultimate responsibility for
health policymaking in Nigeria. The NMCP as a department of
FMOH executes policy, and fulfills a coordination role. States have
concurrent jurisdiction to make policy and strategy decisions.
National malaria control program is statutorily responsible for
policymaking, as a division in the federal ministry of health be-
cause, you know, in Nigeria health is decentralized, national,
state and then the local government levels” (Policymaker).
Respondents cited the ministries of education, information, wom-
en’s affairs, environment, agriculture and finance as stakeholders in
the vector control strategy decision-making process. Regulatory
bodies such as the National Agency for Food and Drug
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) who oversee the use of
products such as insecticides were also cited as being critical to vec-
tor control strategy decision-making and implementation.
Advisory/technical
All partners involved in malaria control in Nigeria are members of
the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, led by the FMOH (WHO and
Nigeria National Malaria Control Programme 2013). They provide
advice to the NMCP, helping steer the overall direction of malaria
control activities. As a group, they engage with the strategy deci-
sion-making process through the Ministerial Coordination
Committee on AIDS, TB and Malaria (WHO and Nigeria National
Malaria Control Programme 2013). The Ministerial Coordination
Committee on AIDS, TB and Malaria is composed of three technical
working groups (one for each disease). The Malaria technical work-
ing group has six sub committees (mirroring the six NMCP depart-
ments) including the IVM-SC. The main technical input into vector
control strategy decisions by stakeholders is through the IVM-SC
(National Malaria Control Programme 2009a).
Consultative
KIs recognized that stakeholder consultation and consensus building
is an integral part of the vector control strategy decision-making
process. While there were no clearly defined junctions where con-
sultations take place, it was recognized, across all respondent cate-
gories, that consensus should be built across a wide range of actors
to facilitate strategy adoption and successful implementation.
It is recognised that malaria control is a collective responsibility
and that in coming up with a strategy the platform for debate
needs to be expanded to segments of the public, private, civil so-
ciety. (NGO)
Evidence generation
All KIs recognized that WHO recommendations provide the first
line of evidence used to support or oppose a vector control strategy.
However, it was also recognized that WHO recommendations are
broad, leaving room for tailored interpretations at country level de-
pending on local context.
. . . but we cannot just grab it (evidence) and change our pol-
icy . . . everything that comes into the country must be piloted, so
the evidence we generate from that pilot will inform our decision
as to whether we can include it in our policy. (Policymaker)
Figure 2. Functions of actors in vector control policymaking
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The NMCP coordinates with researchers from academic and re-
search institutions to test new products in local trials for vector sus-
ceptibility and community acceptability. KIs from the public and
private sector reported that the norm is for manufacturers to finance
these trials with the NMCP and researchers overseeing the testing.
This locally generated evidence is a prerequisite for the adoption of
a vector control strategy, particularly in determining which insecti-
cides to use.
Everything that comes into the country that has a potential of
adding value into vector control must be piloted, so the evidence
we generate from that pilot will inform our decision as to
whether we can include it in our policy. (Policymaker)
Research institutions, such as the National Institute of Medical
Research and individuals from a number of universities at national
and in some cases at state level also participate in the IVM-SC.
However, without a clearly formalized link or tradition of commis-
sioning research by the NMCP this interaction is more opportunistic
and based on personal relationships.
. . . The country as a whole does not have a health research plan
and so when people do research they do research to publish, to
get promotion . . . . . . there is no formal channel, if I find some-
thing that is interesting the only thing I can do is talk to my dir-
ector who can then call a press briefing. (Researcher)
Process
Interviewees from all categories reported that the normal policy pro-
cess is initiated by a recognized failure in this strategy, the potential
for new funding or the availability of new evidence. The IVM-SC is
the forum for debating the need for, and evidence in relation to, a
strategy adoption or change (National Malaria Control Programme
2009a). Interviewees all agreed that strategy is normally developed
by the NMCP in collaboration with primarily the members of the
IVM-SC, and channelled to the national coordinator and then the
Minister of Health for endorsement with consultation of wider
stakeholders at key points in the process.
These sub- committees are made up of partners who are ex-
perts . . . so when a policy is about to be made, these partners
come together and brainstorm and take a decision on if that pol-
icy will benefit the country and if they think it would, then they
work on it and then send it to the Honourable Minister of Health
for him to ratify. (NGO)
In some instances, the decision is referred to the National Council
on Health (NCH) and the Federal Executive Council (FEC). While
there was uncertainty around what factors trigger the involvement
of NCH and FEC, the use of government funding was cited as one
potential factor.
A lot of time if that policy involves Nigeria’s money it will have
to go to the FEC. (NGO)
Content
The policy targets and progress against them for malaria vector con-
trol in Nigeria are summarized in Table 3.
Evidence
When asked about evidence, KIs cited a wide range of sources as
‘trusted’ forms of evidence. These included WHO recommendations,
results from household surveys, systematic reviews, meta-analyses,
published literature, implementation research, feedback and results
of locally generated evidence.
First and most important will be WHO recommendations, se-
cond will be published literature and documents from RBM
working group, and then the last will be lessons learnt documen-
tation and reports. (NGO)
KIs viewed scientific evidence as being useful for lobbying, creating
awareness, documenting objective positions, defending decisions
and catalyzing change. However, it was recognized that the neces-
sary evidence was not always available. Furthermore, different
stakeholder value and prioritize evidence differently. For example,
respondents involved in funding malaria, typically external donors,
appeared to place more value on the use of cost-effectiveness in deci-
sion-making.
. . . most of it is donor money, so donors are more aware of try-
ing to get the best bang for their buck. (NGO)
Cost-effectiveness has been a concept of donors, UN agencies,
partners and not government, sensu stricto. (Multilateral)
Whereas policymakers prioritize locally generated evidence.
What I am trying to say is that, local evidence is very critical, but
you must compare it with the standard. (Policymaker)
Finally, it is recognized that in the process of decision-making, evi-
dence can be ignored. As the debate proceeds from the technical to
the political levels, wider political and socioeconomic factors can
come more strongly into play.
But the disconnect is when it gets to minister of health a lot of
political influence comes into play. (NGO)
Power
Interviewees identified two main groups of actors as having the
most influence in the policy process. First, all stakeholder categories
recognized the national and state government’s mandate to endorse
policy decisions, thus conferring significant influence over the
process.
For national policymaking, policy change decision-making, def-
initely as I told you before is the government. (Multilateral)
Second, donor influence was viewed as a key driver in the policy
process. Respondents generally viewed the biggest catalyst for policy
change as donor funding with one respondent citing the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as an actor that has
been able to utilize its financial power to drive through a number of
policy changes.
‘The potential for new funding could drive a policy process, for
instance if a donor has an interest in helping in the country
changes its policy . . . .And this is very common with Global
Fund, for instance it has been able to drive a number of policy
changes that go faster than ordinarily because the motivation to
change the policy is there. (NGO)
Larviciding policy analysis
Context
One of the key factors that facilitated the decision to scale-up larvi-
ciding was its potential to contribute to national economic develop-
ment objectives through the technology transfer and the
establishment of a microbial larvicide factory in Nigeria.
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In a country like Nigeria definitely there is interest to see more
job creation, more wealth creation. (NGO)
At the point at which an intervention is targeted at economic de-
velopment but is said to have benefits for malaria control be it re-
motely or otherwise, and the audience for that has a bigger
agenda and malaria control is just the smallest part of it, the ten-
dency is that the malaria message gets drowned out. (NGO)
These views recognize that, contributions to the wider socioeco-
nomic context can be highly influential in malaria vector control
strategy decisions.
Actors
When asked about the actors involved in the decision to scale-up lar-
viciding in Nigeria, interviewees cited the ECOWAS, the office of
the Presidency of Nigeria and the Minister of Health. None of the
interviewees mentioned that the decision had been technically
debated at the IVM-SC level. A number of actors who normally par-
ticipate in vector control policy decisions felt excluded from the lar-
viciding decision, particularly those that play advisory, consultative
and evidence generation roles.
‘It’s a closed (discussion) . . . in fact it’s not something we should
talk about. That’s why the donor agencies or development part-
ners in Nigeria are against that project, because it is shielded
from them. (Private sector)
The discussion on larviciding did not include donors. (NGO)
Process
Interviewees reported that the decision-making process for larvicid-
ing deviated from the normal vector control decision-making pro-
cess. The process flowed from the top (ECOWAS and presidential
levels) to the bottom (NMCP level). The prevailing perception by all
interviewees was that decisions were taken at high levels.
There is nothing people like us can do where the minister meets
and ECOWAS takes a decision that this is what we want to do.
(Researcher)
The normal vector control policy process is contrasted with the
larviciding process in Figure 3. The larviciding decision process, as
described by the respondents was shorter, appears to have been
started by a decision at the highest levels of government and circum-
vented a number of policy processes and actors that are reflected in
the normal processes of vector control policymaking.
Content
The Nigerian NMSP 2009–2013 currently recognizes the ‘limited
application of larviciding and environmental management’ for vec-
tor control (National Malaria Control Programme 2009b). A
new NMSP for 2014 and beyond is being developed and it is ex-
pected that it will feature larviciding more prominently to reflect the
country’s commitment to nationwide scale-up. Beyond that, KIs
were unable to give details of what the larviciding strategy would
entail.
Evidence
Most respondents cited the use of some evidence to support the lar-
viciding decision. KIs reported that ‘small’ evidence, i.e. evidence
from the local pilot projects supported by the larvicide manufac-
turer, was used as the basis for the decision to implement larviciding
at scale. This is in line with the reported norm for evidence in policy-
making with locally produced evidence being used to validate inter-
national evidence in the local context. However, in this instance,
results from local trials were used to support the use of the Bactivec
strain which is not recommended by WHOPES and some actors, pri-
marily those outside of government, perceived that the evidence pro-
duced was not open to scrutiny and debate.
It may not be big evidence, because I know people are looking
for the big evidence, . . . we don’t have that type of evidence we
are still generating. (Policymaker)
These studies were just to find out the efficacy of some of the
larvicides, it is not an extensive one but just to determine the effi-
cacy and once that has been determined, we said ok if we deploy
this thing, following the appropriate standard and the best prac-
tices that will be able to achieve much hence we decided to do
that. (Policymaker)
Members of the broader stakeholder group were either unaware of
the role of evidence or questioned the quality of the evidence used in
the decision-making.
I’m sure it (evidence) would have played some role, but then like
I said, the decisions were taken at a higher level . . . (NGO)
I don’t want to use the word ‘questionable’. But also there are
doubts, there are concerns as to the concrete, you know like the
strength of their evidence. (NGO)
There is no evidence there. In fact, from what I know the matter
has gone up high before the evidence were being gathered.
(Private sector)
There was this larviciding project that was embarked upon by
Rivers State government by
Labiofam where they used some insecticide and the report indi-
cated that malaria prevalence in Rivers State actually had come
down. (Policymaker)
The prevailing view amongst the wider stakeholders is that there
exists little evidence and no policy framework to support nationwide
larviciding in Nigeria with Bactivec. All stakeholders except for the
policymakers held this view.
No scientific evidence to support the decision to carry out nation-
wide larviciding (NGO)
In Nigeria they got it wrong; the larviciding they want to do is
not based on any policy. (Private sector)
Table 3. Targets and progress: malaria vector control in Nigeria
Intervention Progress to 2010 (National Population Commission
and National Malaria Control Programme 2010)
2013 Target (National Malaria Control
Programme 2009)
Indoor residual spraying 1% of target population received IRS At least 80% of targeted population protected
Distribution of long lasting
insecticidal nets
42% ITN household ownership and 29% use achieved At least 80% of households with two or more
LLINs/ITNs and 80% use by 2013
Larviciding Piloted in four states As appropriate in some selected areas
Health Policy and Planning, 2015, Vol. 00, No. 0 7
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The stakeholders’ objection to the larviciding strategy in Nigeria is
summed up by three arguments. First, that Nigeria does not repre-
sent an appropriate context for the larviciding:
I think we do not represent the kind of place that larviciding
would be effective on a large scale. (NGO)
However, the policymakers assert that the implementation of larvi-
ciding will be aligned to the WHO position on larviciding.
It is going to be in the context of that “few, fixed and findable,”
unfortunately many people who are inside the box think that we
are taking larviciding everywhere in Nigeria is not like that . . .
no reasonable technical person will, it doesn’t make sense.
(Policymaker)
Second, there were concerns that the selection of larvicide strain
used was not WHOPES recommended, which contradicts the usual
reliance on WHO recommendation and that the local evidence gen-
erated and used to support this decision was not sufficiently robust
or independent.
Finally, and perhaps where the strength of the wider stake-
holder’s argument lies is in the fact that larviciding represents a dis-
traction from the primary malaria control interventions.
When you look at malaria control, spending all this money
on larviciding when you don’t have sufficient funding to fill all
your gaps for other commodities, you know, from a cost effective
perspective, it would be more cost effective to take that
money and put it into nets, if you’re doing vector control or
RDTs or ACTs right, from a whole perspective of Malaria con-
trol. (NGO)
Power
The tripartite agreement, between ECOWAS, Venezuela and Cuba
features financial and technical support to scale-up larviciding and
technology transfer. Hence, financial power played a major role in
the larviciding decision, but those exercising power were different to
those perceived to wield this power in the normative situation.
Rivers State, the site of some of the pilot studies used as evidence
for scaling-up larviciding, is the proposed site of the bio-larvicide
factory (ECOWAS 2013). The Rivers State governor is a highly in-
fluential politician hence the technological and direct socioeconomic
benefits of larviciding to Rivers State potentially created a formid-
able champion for scaling-up larviciding.
The commitment to scaling-up larviciding at the highest levels of
government in Nigeria made the decision virtually unstoppable,
with the hierarchical structure of the FMOH making the decision
difficult to challenge.
At the point at which decisions are taken at the highest level of
government the natural tendency from the government stand
point is you support the decisions that are made by our superiors.
(NGO)
In addition, there was an apparent restriction of information flow
whereby all respondents, including those in NMCP, could not out-
line the details of the strategy for implementing larviciding, beyond
the fact that it will be scaled-up nationwide. This control of infor-
mation limits the policy actor’s ability to debate and build consensus
around the intervention in the usual way.
Discussion
This study is the first time that the decision to scale-up larviciding
has been compared with normal policymaking processes in Nigeria.
A review of the health policy analysis literature up to 2007 (Gilson
and Raphaely 2008) included only six articles on malaria, all of
which focused on treatment policies in Africa. Since then there has
been a number of policy analyses in Sub-Saharan Africa looking at
malaria treatment policy (Diap et al. 2010; Malisa et al. 2011;
Martins et al. 2013; Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2014a,b), malaria in
Figure 3. Vector control actors and processes: normative vs larviciding example
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pregnancy interventions (Hill et al. 2013), and diagnosis (Bastiaens
et al. 2011).
Changing malaria policy is generally seen to be a complex pro-
cess (Williams et al. 2004; Amin et al. 2007). For example, the adop-
tion of LLINs as global and then national policy across sub-Saharan
Africa was a lengthy process involving multiple studies to demon-
strate efficacy, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and acceptability to
end-users (Hill et al. 2006).
In the southern and east African contexts, policy analyses have
been carried on integrated vector management (Mutero et al. 2012;
Chanda et al. 2013), malaria control including vector control
(Woelk et al. 2009; Mutero et al. 2014) malaria vector control (Cliff
et al. 2010) and IRS (Montgomery et al. 2010). These studies have
highlighted the value of local champions, international networks
and the involvement of researchers in policy development in trans-
lating research into policy (Woelk et al. 2009). They also identified
the critical importance of empirical data in informing decision-mak-
ing and a need for a coordinated multipronged approach to vector
control (Chanda et al. 2013). These studies demonstrate how factors
such as outside influence and past experience of an intervention can
slow the process of policy change (Cliff et al. 2010).
Policy analysis literature from South East Asia identifies similar
critical factors in shaping policy despite being primarily focused on
HIV/AIDS, and universal health coverage (Tangcharoensathien
et al. 2004; Tantivess and Walt 2008; Teerawattananon and
Russell 2008). Only one study in this context addresses malaria pol-
icy change but it focuses on the region’s unique epidemiological
challenges. The focus on regional cooperation to deal with cross
border malaria transmission and elimination is not currently directly
comparable to the sub-Saharan African context (Bharati and
Ganguly 2013).
The larviciding decision in Nigeria demonstrates a number of ex-
amples of power in policymaking. The decision was characterized
by a top-down policy process with the FMOH overtly exercising its
power to involve new actors and restrict the involvement of some
traditional actors. All participants recognized that the Nigerian gov-
ernment had the ultimate decision-making power in policymaking.
However, a tradition of involving the RBM partners, private sector,
NGOs and the research community has created the expectation of
wider participation and power sharing. This consultative process
usually creates opportunities for debates to occur and promotes the
production and exchange of evidence (Young 2005). Hence, the de-
cision to restrict the actors involved and knowledge shared in the
policy process allowed for selective use of evidence, akin to what
Weiss describes as the ‘political’ use of research (Weiss 1979), caus-
ing concern over the quality of research evidence used in policy-
making as observed in other contexts (Mutero et al. 2012). The
actions of the FMOH undermined the norm of closely adhering to
WHO policies, which traditionally set the context (agenda) for pol-
icymaking in malaria control.
Studies have cited a belief that donor preferences and agendas
were exerting too much influence on malaria policies in the coun-
tries and that national level government actors are not adequately
engaged in malaria control policymaking (Mutero et al. 2014). In
this instance national leadership/ownership of a policy decision and
engagement of different actors was highly controversial and heavily
criticized. In 2012 WHO published an interim position statement on
the role of larviciding in malaria control (World Health
Organization 2012), in a bid to provide clear recommendations as a
number of countries explored the use of larviciding. Alongside the
WHO’s technical mandate, it is arguable that this statement had the
power to influence global opinion i.e. an exercise of power as
thought control. It is difficult to ascertain if the reaction of
traditional actors was based only on the cited technical reasons, or if
it was also due in part to displeasure at their power to influence
being undermined. Either way this analysis highlights a potential
conflict between greater national ownership of malaria policy deci-
sions and adherence to internationally recognized standards and pol-
icy guidance which some view as an externally imposed donor
construct.
This study demonstrates the persuasive power, especially to na-
tional policymakers of considering the wider socioeconomic context
of vector control. The proposed local manufacture of the product,
and the labour intensive nature of the intervention delivery, has po-
tential to create large numbers of jobs and benefit the local and na-
tional economy. National level political actors may have selected the
intervention based inter alia on the potential domestic economic
benefits. The societal and economic benefits of controlling malaria
are commonly used to justify intervention in malaria control. But
when it comes to selecting between alternative interventions to con-
trol malaria, the process and actors tend to focus on evidence of
health benefits (effectiveness) and cost-effectiveness. Cost-effective-
ness analysis ignores the wider economic benefits of malaria control
to domestic economies. Economic evaluations of alternative vector
control interventions at country level would do well to consider the
domestic economic impact of each approach and where these differ
between interventions it should form the basis of discussion/debate
with stakeholders beyond the malaria/health sector. If interventions
are effective and can be shown to have a positive economic benefit
(either directly, or indirectly through their impact on malaria) this
could help generate additional domestic financing for malaria con-
trol. This would help achieve the Abuja declaration target of 15%
government contribution to health expenditure (RBM 2000).
Political analysts recognize that the policymaking process is highly
variable, ranging from a set of clearly defined stages followed by the
rational weighing of competing options with the selection of the most
optimal choice (Hogwood and Gunn 1984), to a process of ‘mud-
dling’ through a complex and messy reality (Sabatier 2007). In this
study, interviewees reported a clearly defined decision-making process
where evidence is weighed and the most appropriate option imple-
mented. The decision to switch from targeted to universal distribution
of LLINs was cited as a particularly successful example. The larvicid-
ing decision is a deviation from the reported norm, arguably falling on
the messy end of the policymaking spectrum. Stakeholders seeking to
engage in the process need to be aware of the risk that, even in coun-
tries with rational policymaking systems, deviations from the estab-
lished norm may occur and each decision can be different.
Limitations
A number of potential limitations to this study exist. Firstly, as only
14 people were interviewed, inevitably some categories of stake-
holders were underrepresented. Secondly, the study had limited ac-
cess to what Shiffman terms ‘policy elites’, a recognized limitation
of policy analysis at this level (Shiffman 2007). The interviewer’s in-
ability to gain access to representatives from ECOWAS, the office of
the presidency, and the Minister of Health, all who were identified
as key actors in the decision to scale-up larviciding, but not identi-
fied in the desk review of ‘normal’ policy actors, denies the study a
perspective that would have been valuable and enriching.
The decision to focus the study on perspectives at the national
level may exclude valuable insight from the community level which
may potentially support elements of the decision to scale-up
larviciding.
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The interviewer had spent time working closely with the NMCP
and had a degree of ‘insider’ status, potentially allowing for greater
insight into the policy analysis (Walt et al. 2008). In this instance, it
allowed the interviewer increased access to respondents, the oppor-
tunity to investigate a ‘sensitive’ issue and an in-depth knowledge
and understanding of the culture aiding in the interpretation of non-
verbal cues.
Conclusion
This study reaffirms that engaging powerful policy champions at the
global and national levels can drive policy processes forward and
thereby accelerate access to new vector control tools. It also suggests
that a greater focus on the domestic economic benefits of malaria
control could help generate greater domestic policy support and po-
tentially finance for its control. However, care needs to be taken to
ensure that inclusion of economic or other national goals does not
result in health policies, which are not based on evidence of inter-
vention effectiveness and internationally recognized standards of
best practice.
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